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ABSTRACT
Within an agent society, agents utilise their knowledge d-
ifferently to achieve their individual or joint goals. Agent
negotiation provides an effective solution to help agents reach
agreements on their future behaviour in the society to guaran-
tee their goals can be achieved successfully. Agents may need
to conduct Multiple Interdependent Negotiations (MIN) with
different opponents and for different purposes, in order to
achieve a goal. By considering the complexity of negotiation
environments, interdependencies, opponents and issues in
the agent society, conducting MIN efficiently is a challenging
research issue. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, most of
the state-of-art work primarily focuses on single negotiation
scenarios and tries to propose sophisticated negotiation pro-
tocols and strategies to help individual agents to succeed in
single negotiation. However, very little work has been done
while considering interdependencies and trade-offs among
multiple negotiations, so as to help both individual agents
as well as the agent society, to increase their welfare. This
paper promotes the research on agent negotiation from the
single negotiation level to the multiple negotiations level.
To effectively conduct MIN in an agent society, this paper
proposes three feasible negotiation procedures, which attempt
to conduct MIN in a successive way, in a concurrent way,
and in a clustered way while considering them in different
negotiation situations, respectively. A simulated agent society
is built to test the proposed negotiation procedures with ran-
dom experimental settings. According to the experimental
results, the successive negotiation procedure produces the
highest time efficiency, the concurrent negotiation procedure
promises the highest profits and success rates, whilst the clus-
tered negotiation procedure provides a well-balanced solution
between negotiation efficiency and effectiveness.
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Multiple interdependent negotiations; negotiation procedures;
social welfare
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1 INTRODUCTION
In an agent society, agents usually have different knowledge
and goals, utilising these differently to achieve their individ-
ual or joint goals. Agent negotiation provides an effective
solution between agents and helps them to achieve a mutual-
ly beneficial negotiation agreement, which will guide agents’
behaviour in the society and lead them to successfully achieve
their goals. To date, most of the existing work on agent ne-
gotiations [4, 5, 9, 10] deals almost exclusively with single
negotiations, and attempts to propose sophisticated solutions
to improve agents’ profits in single negotiations. To the best
of the authors’ knowledge, very little work has been done
while considering interdependencies and trade-offs among
multiple negotiations, so as to help both individual agents as
well as the agent society, to increase their welfare.
In an agent society, agents may conduct multiple interac-
tions with each other and would need to conduct Multiple
Interdependent Negotiations (MIN) with different opponents
and for different purposes to achieve their goals. By con-
sidering the complexity of negotiation environments, inter-
dependencies, opponents and issues in the agent society, to
effectively conduct MIN is a challenging research issue. For in-
stance, through using the Internet, a travel agent can interact
with other agents for a trip package with a budget and time
requirement, which may include a flight, accommodation and
some tourist activities. Typically, the agent will conduct mul-
tiple negotiations for flights, accommodations and activities,
respectively, and these negotiations are interdependent when
considering the factors of budget, sequence and time. During
the negotiations, the agent’s goal is to achieve a series of
negotiation agreements with the minimal price and a suitable
schedule to satisfy the budget and the time requirement. To
achieve such a goal, an appropriate negotiation procedure
must be used to conduct these negotiations, and this is still
a challenging research issue in agent negotiation.
Usually, the interdependency between MIN is determined
by the interdependencies of negotiation issues included within
the MIN. Figure 1 shows an example of issue interdependen-
cies which could exist within MIN. The three big circles
indicate three negotiations, i.e., 𝑁0, 𝑁1 and 𝑁2; and the dots,
squares and triangles in the big circles indicate negotiation
Figure 1: An example of issue interdependencies in
MIN
issues included by the three negotiations, respectively. The
overlapped shaded areas between MIN indicate the inter-
dependencies of their negotiation issues. In current litera-
ture, a large amount of work exclusively studies the issue
interdependency within a particular multi-issue negotiation
[2, 5, 9, 11], which is represented by the non-shaded areas
in Figure 1. Three general issue procedures [6, 7] are well
known by researchers, which are the simultaneous procedure,
the sequential procedure and the package deal procedure.
By using these issue procedures, a single negotiation with
multiple issues can be effectively processed. However, very
little work considers issue interdependencies across MIN in
the research of agent negotiation due to the complexities of
MIN. Hemaissia et al. [8] proposed a multilateral negotia-
tion protocol with consideration of dependencies between
issues. However, this approach only deals with issue depen-
dencies in a single negotiation. Mansour et al. [15] proposed
an approach to handle multiple negotiations, however, issue
interdependencies between multiple negotiations were not
considered.
This paper aims to address this gap in the existing agent
negotiation research. Through studying the issue interdepen-
dency across MIN, feasible negotiation procedures for effec-
tively conducting MIN are proposed to help agents achieve
multiple negotiation agreements so as to direct their methods
to achieve success in an agent society. This paper promotes
the current research on agent negotiation from the single
negotiation level to the multiple negotiations level. To ad-
dress the challenge of the negotiation procedure in MIN, three
research problems have to be considered in this paper: 1)
how to model the MIN, 2) how to generate negotiation offers
by considering issue interdependencies across MIN, and 3)
how to conduct negotiations in MIN. For the first research
problem, this paper proposes a general MIN model by using
a negotiation network; for the second research problem, this
paper proposes an approximating Pareto-optimal offer gener-
ating strategy; and for the third research problem, this paper
proposes three feasible negotiation procedures for conducting
MIN, i.e., the successive negotiation procedure, the concurrent
negotiation procedure and the clustered negotiation procedure.
The analysis of the three proposed negotiation procedures is
also given based on the experimental results.
The organisation of this paper is as follows. Section 2
presents a general MIN model. Section 3 proposes an offer
generation strategy while considering issue interdependencies
across MIN. Section 4 proposes three negotiation procedures
for conducting MIN. Section 5 introduces an experimental
analysis of the proposed solutions. Sections 6 and 7 present
related work and the conclusion of this paper, respectively.
2 A GENERAL MODEL FOR MIN
This section proposes a general MIN model. The MIN con-
ducted by an agent can form a negotiation network. In this
negotiation network, the agent negotiates with different oppo-
nents in different negotiations, and each negotiation contains
different numbers of negotiation issues. Such a negotiation
network for an agent can be formalised as follows.
Let Θ = {N,A, S,O, I} be a negotiation network in which
Agent 𝑎 conducts an MIN. In details, let
∙ N = {𝑁0, · · ·𝑁𝑖, · · · 𝑁𝑚}(𝑖 ≥ 0) denote a set of ne-
gotiations involved in the MIN, where 𝑁𝑖 indicates a
bilateral single-issue/multi-issue negotiation;
∙ A = {𝑎𝑁0 , · · · 𝑎𝑁𝑖 , · · · 𝑎𝑁𝑚} (𝑖 ≥ 0) denote a set of
Agent 𝑎’s negotiation opponent in every single negotia-
tion, where 𝑎𝑁𝑖 is Agent 𝑎’s opponent in Negotiation
𝑁𝑖;
∙ S = {S𝑁0 , · · · S𝑁𝑖 , · · · S𝑁𝑚}(𝑖 ≥ 0) denote a set of
issue sets for every single negotiation, where S𝑁𝑖 =
{𝑠0, · · · 𝑠𝑗 , · · · 𝑠𝑛}(𝑗 ≥ 0) denotes all issues included
within Negotiation 𝑁𝑖;
∙ O = {F𝑁0 , · · ·F𝑁𝑖 , · · ·F𝑁𝑚}(𝑖 ≥ 0) denote a set of of-
fer sets for all negotiations, where F𝑁𝑖 = {O𝑎,O𝑎𝑁𝑖 }
indicates a set of offer sets for Negotiation 𝑁𝑖. O𝑎 =
{𝑜𝑡0𝑎 , · · · 𝑜𝑡𝑘𝑎 , · · · 𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑎 } is a set of offers proposed by Agent
𝑎 in Negotiation𝑁𝑖, andO𝑎𝑁𝑖 = {𝑜
𝑡0
𝑎𝑁𝑖
, · · · 𝑜𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑁𝑖 , · · · 𝑜
𝑡ℎ
𝑎𝑁𝑖
}
is a set of counter-offers proposed by Opponent 𝑎𝑁𝑖
in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, e.g., 𝑜
𝑡𝑟
𝑎𝑁𝑖
indicates a counter-offer
given by Opponent 𝑎𝑁𝑖 in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 at period 𝑡𝑟;
∙ I = {𝑖0, · · · 𝑖𝑝, · · · 𝑖𝑞} indicate a set of issue interde-
pendencies, where 𝑖𝑝 = {𝑠𝑙 v · · · v 𝑠𝑚 v · · · v
𝑠𝑛|(𝑠𝑙, · · · 𝑠𝑚, · · · 𝑠𝑛) ∈ S𝑁𝑖 × · · · × S𝑁𝑗 × · · · × S𝑁𝑘}
indicates a set of issues satisfying an issue interdepen-
dency defined by Definition 1.
In the proposed MIN model, each single Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 is
defined as a bilateral negotiation, i.e., the negotiation involves
exactly two agents. A conventional multilateral negotiation,
i.e., the negotiation involves multiple agents, is represented
by multiple bilateral negotiations with the exactly same
negotiation settings. Therefore, the proposed MIN model is
general and can cover all possible negotiation scenarios.
The formal definition of the issue interdependency across
MIN is introduced as follows.
Definition 1. (Issue Interdependency) Let 𝑖𝑝 = {𝑠𝑙 v
· · · v 𝑠𝑚 v · · · v 𝑠𝑛|(𝑠𝑙, · · · 𝑠𝑚, · · · 𝑠𝑛) ∈ S𝑁𝑖×· · ·×S𝑁𝑗×· · ·×
S𝑁𝑘} denote an issue interdependency between multiple is-
sues in MIN, and it reflects an interactive restriction between
issues across multiple negotiations. Specifically, 𝑠𝑙 v 𝑠𝑚 in-
dicates that the sub-offer on Issue 𝑠𝑙 in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 and
the sub-offer on Issue 𝑠𝑚 in Negotiation 𝑁𝑗 are influenced
with each other, and 𝑠𝑙 v 𝑠𝑚 ⇔ 𝑠𝑚 v 𝑠𝑙.
Let 𝑜𝑡𝑎 ∈ O𝑎(𝑖.𝑒.,O𝑎 ∈ F𝑁 , 𝑁 ∈ N) denote the offer given
by Agent 𝑎 at negotiation period 𝑡 in Negotiation 𝑁 , and
𝑜𝑡𝑎(𝑠) (𝑠 ∈ S𝑁 ) indicates the sub-offer on Issue 𝑠. Assuming an
issue interdependency is 𝑠𝑙 v · · · v 𝑠𝑚 v · · · v 𝑠𝑛, Equation
(1) represents the mathematical relationship between issues
in an issue interdependency.
𝑛∑︁
𝑚=𝑙
(︀
𝜇𝑚 × 𝑜𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑗 (𝑠𝑚)
)︀
≤ 𝑄, (1)
where 𝜇𝑚 is the coefficient for the sub-offer on Issue 𝑠𝑚 in
Negotiation 𝑁𝑗 and 𝑄 is a constant, 𝑡𝑘 indicates a negotiation
period.
3 OFFER GENERATION STRATEGY
IN MIN
Agent 𝑎’s strategy of generating offers in single multi-issue
negotiation is not the focus of this paper. Therefore, we adopt
the “shortest distance strategy” [12, 13] and do an extension
to handle issue interdependencies across MIN. The reason
why this strategy is employed is that the “shortest distance
strategy” has been proved to be one of the strategies which
could generate an approximating Pareto-optimal solution in
the multi-issue negotiation. The core idea of the “shortest
distance strategy” is to always select the point which has the
shortest distance with the point on its opponent’s indifference
curves (surfaces) (i.e., points on an agent’s indifference curves
(surfaces) denote the same utility for the agent).
To better describe agent’s strategy affected by issue in-
terdependencies, “Edgeworth-Bowley Box” [21] is employed,
which is frequently utilised in “equilibrium theory” and it
aids in bargaining problems of game theory. To simplify
the discussion, we take a simple negotiation scenario as an
example, where Agent 𝑎 conducts an MIN with its oppo-
nents. One of the negotiations in the MIN is 𝑁0, Agent 𝑎’s
opponent in Negotiation 𝑁0 is 𝑎𝑁0 , the negotiation issues
are 𝑠0 and 𝑠1. Issue 𝑠1 may have an interdependency with
issues in other negotiations, e.g., 𝑖0 = {𝑠1 v · · · v 𝑠𝑚 v
· · · v 𝑠𝑛|(𝑠1, · · · 𝑠𝑚, · · · 𝑠𝑛) ∈ S𝑁0 × · · · × S𝑁𝑗 × · · · × S𝑁𝑘}.
Figure 2 shows Agent 𝑎’s strategy of generating offers while
considering the issue interdependency 𝑖0 across MIN.
At period 𝑡0 − 1 (see Figure 2), Agent 𝑎’s opponent 𝑎𝑁0
proposes a counter-offer 𝑜𝑡0−1𝑎𝑁0 to Agent 𝑎. At period 𝑡0, if
Issue 𝑠1 is not involved in the issue interdependency 𝑖0, Agent
𝑎 selects an offer 𝑜𝑡0𝑎 , represented by a black square, which
has the shortest distance with the point 𝑜𝑡0−1𝑎𝑁0 . However, if
Issue 𝑠1 is involved in the issue interdependency 𝑖0, Agen-
t 𝑎 selects an offer 𝑜𝑡0𝑎 , represented by a black dot, which
simultaneously satisfies conditions of having the shortest dis-
tance with the point 𝑜𝑡0−1𝑎𝑁0 and falling in the shaded area 𝑃
𝑡0
𝑎 ,
where the shaded area 𝑃 𝑡0𝑎 is calculated by the mathematical
restriction of the issue interdependency 𝑖0 between Issue 𝑠1
Figure 2: Edgeworth-Bowley box for agent’s strategy
affected by issue interdependencies across MIN
and other issues involved in the issue interdependency. The
values of the sub-offers on these other issues are the last
values offered in their corresponding negotiations. Based on
these values and the mathematical restriction of the issue
interdependency 𝑖0, the value range of the sub-offer on Issue
𝑠1 can be calculated, then the shaded area 𝑃
𝑡0
𝑎 is determined.
By employing the strategy, the negotiation is conducted until
an offer is accepted or a deadline is reached.
4 NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES FOR
MIN
The negotiation procedure for MIN indicates how agents con-
duct an MIN, which is crucial to the success of conducting the
MIN. Let N = {𝑁0, · · ·𝑁𝑖, · · ·𝑁𝑚} be an MIN conducted by
Agent 𝑎, where 𝑁𝑖 denotes a bilateral single-issue/multi-issue
negotiation. It is assumed that Agent 𝑎 has its private prefer-
ence on the importance of each negotiation in the MIN. The
preference can be represented by a set V = {𝜈0, · · · 𝜈𝑖, · · · 𝜈𝑚},
where 𝜈𝑖 indicates the importance of Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 for A-
gent 𝑎. This section proposes the following three negotiation
procedures to conduct MIN in different situations.
(1) Successive Negotiation Procedure
In the successive negotiation procedure, the agent pro-
cesses multiple negotiations one after another. The sequence
of processing these negotiations is dependent on the impor-
tance of negotiations. That is to say, the agent always firstly
processes the most important negotiation. After the former
negotiation is completed, the agent processes the next one.
Once a negotiation is completed, all issues in the completed
negotiation have been settled. The agent’s decision-makings
in the latter negotiations are affected by the interdependen-
cies from the settled issues in completed negotiations.
Algorithm 1 shows the successive negotiation procedure
for processing an MIN conducted by Agent 𝑎. In Algo-
rithm 1, the input is a negotiation network Θ𝑎 involving
an MIN, and the output is outcomes of all negotiations in
the MIN. Firstly, Agent 𝑎 sorts all 𝑚 negotiations based
on their importance, and gets a negotiation sequence, e.g.,
𝑁0 → · · · → 𝑁𝑖 → · · · → 𝑁𝑚 (Line 3). Then Agent 𝑎 con-
ducts all negotiations based on the negotiation sequence.
Algorithm 1: Successive Negotiation Procedure
1 Input: a negotiation network Θ𝑎, involving an MIN.
2 Output: the outcomes of all negotiation in the MIN.
3 Pre-calculations: sort all 𝑚 negotiations in the MIN
based on their importance and get the negotiation
sequence, e.g., 𝑁0 → · · · → 𝑁𝑖 → · · · → 𝑁𝑚−1, where
𝜈0 ≥ · · · ≥ 𝜈𝑖 ≥ · · · ≥ 𝜈𝑚−1.
4 for 𝑖← 0 to 𝑚− 1 do
5 if issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 have issue interdependencies
with issues in other negotiations then
6 retrieve all latest values of sub-offers on issues related
in issue interdependencies and store the values in a
list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
7 conduct Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 using the proposed strategy in
Section 3 while considering the values in the list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
8 if Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 is completed then
9 record the result of Negotiation 𝑁0, i.e., success or
failure, and calculate the utility achieved in
Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, i.e., 𝑈(𝑁𝑖)
10 𝑖← 𝑖+ 1
11 return the outcomes of all negotiations in the MIN
During conducting a negotiation (e.g., 𝑁𝑖), the agent checks
interdependencies of issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, then retrieves
all last values of sub-offers on the issues, which have issue
interdependencies with issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 (Lines 5-
6). Agent 𝑎 adopts the proposed strategy in Section 3 to
negotiate with its opponent (Line 7). For each completed
negotiation, Agent 𝑎 records the result of the negotiation and
calculates the utility achieved in the negotiation (Lines 8-9).
Agent 𝑎 follows the same procedure to successively conduct
all 𝑚 negotiations until all of them are completed.
(2) Concurrent Negotiation Procedure
In the concurrent negotiation procedure, the agent con-
currently processes all negotiations. The agent’s decision-
makings in each negotiation are affected by issue interdepen-
dencies across MIN during the negotiation process.
As very limited work exits on solving the problem of con-
currently handling MIN, this paper proposes the following
transition system-based approach to solve this problem. To
handle the concurrency in MIN, a transition system is em-
ployed in the concurrent negotiation procedure.
A general transition system 𝑇𝑆 is a tuple 𝑇𝑆 =< 𝑆, 𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡,
𝐺 > [3], where 𝑆 indicates a set of states, 𝐼 indicates a set of
initial states and 𝐼 ⊆ 𝑆, 𝐴𝑐𝑡 = {𝑎0, · · · 𝑎𝑖, · · · 𝑎𝑐} is a set of
actions, where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 × 𝑆 and 𝐺 is a set of final states and
𝐺 ⊆ 𝑆.
Based on the definition of the general transition system, we
define a transition system-based representation of multiple
negotiations as follows.
A set of negotiations N = {𝑁0, · · ·𝑁𝑖, · · ·𝑁𝑚} in a ne-
gotiation network Θ𝑎 can be represented by a concurrent
system 𝑇𝑆N = 𝑇𝑆𝑁0 || · · · ||𝑇𝑆𝑁𝑖 || · · · ||𝑇𝑆𝑁𝑚 , where 𝑇𝑆𝑁𝑖
indicates a transition system-based representation of Ne-
gotiation 𝑁𝑖, i.e., 𝑇𝑆𝑁𝑖 =< 𝑆, 𝐼,𝐴𝑐𝑡,𝐺, 𝑐𝑠 >, where 𝑆 =
{𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠}, 𝐼 = {𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙}, 𝐴𝑐𝑡 =
{(𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙, 𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔), (𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔), (𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒),
(𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠)}, 𝐺 = {𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠}, and 𝑐𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 in-
dicates the current state of Negotiation 𝑁𝑖.
Algorithm 2 shows the concurrent negotiation procedure
for conducting MIN. The concurrency of MIN is handled by
the proposed transition system-based approach.
Algorithm 2: Concurrent Negotiation Procedure
1 Input: a negotiation network Θ𝑎, involving an MIN.
2 Output: the outcomes of all negotiations in the MIN.
3 Pre-calculations: calculate the transition system 𝑇𝑆N.
4 concurrently start conducting all 𝑚 negotiations in the
MIN
5 while not all negotiations are completed do
6 if Agent 𝑎 receives a counter-offer from its opponent
in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 then
7 retrieve all last values of sub-offers on issues in
other negotiations which have interdependencies
with issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, and store the
values in a list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
8 adopt the proposed strategy in Section 3 while
considering the values in the list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
9 if Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 is completed then
10 record the result of Negotiation 𝑁0, i.e., success
or failure, and calculate the utility achieved in
Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, i.e., 𝑈(𝑁𝑖)
11 return the outcomes of all negotiations in the MIN
In Algorithm 2, the input is a negotiation network Θ𝑎
involving an MIN, and the output is the outcomes of all
negotiations in the MIN. First, the transition system 𝑇𝑆N is
precalculated based on the negotiation network Θ𝑎 (Line 3).
The Agent 𝑎 concurrently starts conducting all negotiations
in the MIN (Line 4). During the negotiations, if Agent 𝑎
receives a counter-offer from its opponent in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖,
Agent 𝑎 checks the issue interdependencies and retrieves all
last values of sub-offers on the issues, having interdependen-
cies with issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 (Lines 6-7). Agent 𝑎 adopts
the proposed strategy in Section 3 to negotiate with its op-
ponent (Line 8). For each completed negotiation, Agent 𝑎
records the result of the negotiation and calculates the utility
achieved in the negotiation (Lines 9-10). All 𝑚 negotiations
are concurrently conducted until all of them are completed.
(3) Clustered Negotiation Procedure
In the clustered negotiation procedure, all 𝑚 negotiations
are firstly partitioned into 𝜇 > 1 disjoint subsets, where each
subset is called a negotiation cluster in this paper. The nego-
tiations in each negotiation cluster are processed by using the
concurrent negotiation procedure. Then, Agent 𝑎 processes
all negotiation clusters by using the successive negotiation
procedure. Once a negotiation cluster is completed (i.e., all
negotiations in the negotiation cluster are completed), all
issues in the completed negotiation cluster have been settled,
and the agent’s decision-makings in latter negotiation clusters
are affected by the issue interdependencies from the complet-
ed negotiation clusters. In general, the clustered negotiation
procedure can cover both the successive negotiation procedure
and the concurrent negotiation procedure. For example, when
𝜇 = 𝑚, we have 𝑚 negotiation clusters which turns the clus-
tered negotiation procedure into the successive negotiation
procedure; when 𝜇 = 1, we have only one negotiation clus-
ter, which turns the clustered negotiation procedure into the
concurrent negotiation procedure. The detailed explanation
of how to cluster an MIN is presented as follows.
Figure 3: An example of issue interdependencies
across MIN
Figure 3 shows an example of issue interdependencies
across MIN. Each big circle indicates a negotiation with mul-
tiple issues, where each black dot indicates a negotiation
issue, an edge between two black dots indicates an issue
interdependency across MIN, and no edge between black
dots indicates no issue interdependency across MIN. This
example shows that there are four multi-issue negotiations
in the MIN, which are Negotiations 𝑁0, 𝑁1, 𝑁2, 𝑁3, and
there are three issue interdependencies across MIN, which
are 𝑠00 v 𝑠20 v 𝑠30, 𝑠01 v 𝑠31 and 𝑠10 v 𝑠21.
For partitioning multiple negotiations into clusters, we
borrow the idea of spectral clustering [14, 18]. In this work,
the “distance” between two negotiations is relevant to the
negotiation strength between the two negotiations. The ne-
gotiation strength 𝜉𝑖𝑗 between Negotiations 𝑁𝑖 and 𝑁𝑗 is
calculated by the number of edges between Negotiations 𝑁𝑖
and 𝑁𝑗 . For instance, 𝜉01 = 𝜉13 = 0, 𝜉02 = 𝜉12 = 𝜉23 = 1,
and 𝜉03 = 2.
Algorithm 3 shows the clustered negotiation procedure for
conducting MIN. In Algorithm 3, the input is a negotia-
tion network Θ𝑎 involving an MIN, and the output is the
outcomes of all involved negotiations. The pre-calculations
include: (1) Agent 𝑎 calculates the negotiation strength be-
tween every two negotiations, (2) Agent 𝑎 applies a clustering
algorithm to partition all 𝑚 negotiations into 𝑘 negotiation
clusters, and (3) Agent 𝑎 gets the cluster sequence by sorting
all negotiation clusters through calculating the importance of
negotiation clusters, i.e., the sum of importance of all negoti-
ations in a negotiation cluster (Line 3). Agent 𝑎 successively
conducts each negotiation cluster based on the cluster se-
quence. During conducting a negotiation cluster (e.g., 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗),
Algorithm 3: Clustered Negotiation Procedure
1 Input: a negotiation network Θ𝑎, involving an MIN.
2 Output: the outcomes of all negotiations in the MIN.
3 Pre-calculations: (1) calculate the negotiation
strength between every two negotiations in the MIN, (2)
use a clustering algorithm to partition all 𝑚 negotiations
into 𝑘 negotiation clusters, and (3) sort all negotiation
clusters based on the sum of importance of all
negotiations in each negotiation cluster to get a cluster
sequence, e.g., 𝐶𝑙𝑢0 → · · · → 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 → · · · → 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑘−1, where∑︀
𝑁𝑖∈𝐶𝑙𝑢0 𝜈𝑖 ≥ · · · ≥
∑︀
𝑁𝑖∈𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 𝜈𝑖 ≥ · · · ≥
∑︀
𝑁𝑖∈𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑘−1 𝜈𝑖,
and 𝜈𝑖 is the importance of Negotiation 𝑁𝑖
4 for 𝑗 ← 0 to 𝑘 − 1 do
5 concurrently conduct all negotiations in Cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗
6 while not all negotiations in Cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 are completed
do
7 if a counter-offer from its opponent in Negotiation
𝑁𝑖 in Cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 is received then
8 retrieve all last values of issues in other
negotiations which have interdependencies with
issues in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, and store the values in a
list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
9 adopt the proposed strategy in Section 3 while
considering the values in the list 𝑙𝑖𝑠
10 if Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 in Cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 is completed then
11 record the result of Negotiation 𝑁0, i.e., success
or failure, and calculate utility achieved in
Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, i.e., 𝑈(𝑁𝑖)
12 𝑗 ← 𝑗 + 1
13 return the outcomes of all negotiations
Agent 𝑎 concurrently conducts all involved negotiations in
the negotiation cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 (Line 5), and Agent 𝑎 adopts
the proposed strategy in Section 3 to negotiate with its op-
ponents in all negotiations in the cluster 𝐶𝑙𝑢𝑗 (Lines 7-9).
For each completed negotiation, Agent 𝑎 records the result
of the negotiation and calculates the utility achieved in the
negotiation (Lines 10-11). Agent 𝑎 concurrently conducts all
negotiations in each negotiation cluster, and conducts all
negotiation clusters successively until all 𝑚 negotiations are
completed.
In this paper, interdependencies between issues in a single
negotiation are not discussed due to well discussions in the
literature. However, we adopt non-linear utility functions in
this paper, which could include the case where issues in the
same negotiation are interdependent. Moreover, how to gener-
ate an optimal result of clustering multiple negotiations is not
the focus of this work. Therefore, the clustering optimization
is not discussed in this paper.
5 EXPERIMENT
In the experiment, we simulate an agent society with various
MIN scenarios, and compare the performance of the three
proposed MIN procedures regarding negotiation efficiency
and effectiveness.
In terms of experimental settings, we give detailed settings
for single negotiations and multiple negotiations, respectively.
As this paper does not focus on single negotiation level, we
adopt a widely used concession strategy, an issue procedure
and a negotiation protocol for agents in every single negotia-
tion with the setting of a series of random parameters. In the
experimental settings for multiple negotiations, we present
different cases of MIN with the setting of various numbers of
negotiations and issue interdependencies across MIN to show
the performance of the three proposed MIN procedures.
5.1 Experimental Settings for Single
Negotiations
In the experiment, the following “time-dependent strategy”
[4] is employed as the concession strategy for agents.
𝑈𝑎(𝑡) = 1− (1− 𝑟𝑎)(
𝑡
𝑇𝑎
)
1
𝛽𝑎 (2)
where 𝑈𝑎(𝑡) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the utility which Agent 𝑎 achieves
at negotiation period 𝑡, 𝑟𝑎 ∈ [0, 1] is Agent 𝑎’s reserved u-
tility, 𝑇𝑎 is Agent 𝑎’s deadline and 𝛽𝑎 indicates Agent 𝑎’s
concession rate.
In this work, the “package deal procedure” [6] is adopted
as the issue procedure to process multiple issues in single
negotiations, and the “alternating offer protocol” [20] is u-
tilised for agents in single negotiations. To get general results
of the proposed approach, all relevant parameters in single
negotiations are randomly selected, and the details are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameters in single negotiations
importance of negotiations random
number of issues random in [3, 8]
issue preference random
deadline random in [10, 20]
reserved utility random in [0, 3, 0.4]
concession rate random in {(0, 1), 1, (1, 3]}
The overall utility achieved by an agent engaged in MIN
N, represented by 𝑈(N), can be calculated by Equation (3).
𝑈(N) =
∑︁
∀𝑁𝑖∈N
(︁
𝑈(𝑁𝑖)× 𝑉 (𝑁𝑖)
)︁
(3)
where 𝑖 ≥ 0, N is the negotiation set, 𝑉 (𝑁𝑖) is the result
of Negotiation 𝑁𝑖, which is calculated by Equation (4), and
𝑈(𝑁𝑖) is the utility achieved by the agent in Negotiation 𝑁𝑖.
𝑉 (𝑁𝑖) =
{︃
0 if Negotiation 𝑁𝑖 is failed,
1 others.
(4)
5.2 Experimental Settings for Multiple
Negotiations
In the experimental settings for multiple negotiations, we
take a number of MIN scenarios with various settings. In
order to get general experimental results, we test the three
proposed MIN procedures in two cases based on different
numbers of negotiations and issue interdependencies. The
detailed experimental settings in the two cases are shown in
Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
Table 2: Experimental settings for case (a)
number of negotiations number of issue interdependencies
4
50% number of negotiations
8
16
30
Table 3: Experimental settings for case (b)
number of negotiations number of issue interdependencies
20
0% number of negotiations
30% number of negotiations
60% number of negotiations
80% number of negotiations
100% number of negotiations
Let us recall a mathematical representation of issues inter-
dependencies shown as Equation (5) (refer to Section 2).
𝑛∑︁
𝑚=𝑙
(︀
𝜇𝑚 × 𝑜𝑡𝑘𝑁𝑗 (𝑠𝑚)
)︀
≤ 𝑄, (5)
where 𝜇𝑚 is the coefficient for the sub-offer on Issue 𝑠𝑚 in
Negotiation 𝑁𝑗 , 𝑄 is a constant, 𝑡𝑘 indicates a negotiation
period, and 𝑛− 𝑙 + 1 is the total number of issues involved
in the issue interdependency.
The experimental settings for parameters in the mathe-
matical representation of issue interdependencies are shown
in Table 4.
Table 4: Parameters in issue interdependencies
𝜇𝑚 random in [1, 3]
𝑄 random in [1, 5]
𝑛− 𝑙 + 1 random in [2, 5]
In the experiment, each single MIN scenario is simulated
100 times by applying the three proposed MIN procedures.
Specifically, the well-known “k-means” algorithm is employed
as a clustering algorithm in the clustered negotiation proce-
dure. Here, as this paper does not focus on the optimization
of MIN procedures, we select a series of values for 𝑘 in the
“k-means” algorithm, and we take the average as the experi-
mental result for the clustered negotiation procedure.
5.3 Experimental Results
In the experiment, we test the performance of three MIN
procedures regarding negotiation effectiveness and efficiency,
where the agent’s overall utility, the success rate of negotia-
tions, and the number of negotiation rounds are reported. The
agent’s overall utility indicates the overall utility achieved by
an agent in an MIN, which can be calculated by Equation
(3). The success rate of negotiations indicates the percentage
of the number of successful negotiations in an MIN. The
number of negotiation rounds indicates the total number of
negotiation rounds of conducting an MIN.
The performances of three MIN procedures are tested in
two cases (refer to Table 2 and Table 3), where
case (a): the number of negotiations is 4, 8, 16, 30, respec-
tively, and the number of issue interdependencies is set as
50% the number of negotiations, and
case (b): the number of negotiations is set as 20, and the
number of issue interdependencies is set as 0% the number
of negotiations, 30% the number of negotiations, 60% the
number of negotiations, 80% the number of negotiations, and
100% the number of negotiations, respectively.
(1) Agent’s overall utility
Figure 4 shows agent’s overall utility achieved by conduct-
ing three MIN procedures in case (a). In Figure 4, the x-axis
indicates the number of negotiations, and the y-axis indicates
the overall utility achieved by the agent in the MIN. From
Figure 4, it can be seen that, regardless of the number of nego-
tiations, the concurrent negotiation procedure could achieve
the highest overall utility while the successive negotiation
procedure might achieve the lowest overall utility.
Figure 4: Agent’s overall utility in case (a)
Figure 5: Agent’s overall utility in case (b)
Figure 5 shows agent’s overall utility achieved by conduct-
ing three MIN procedures in case (b). In Figure 5, the x-axis
indicates the number of issue interdependencies (e.g., “30%”
indicates that the number of issue interdependencies is 30%
the number of negotiations), and the y-axis indicates the
overall utility achieved by the agent in the MIN. From Figure
5, it can be seen that agent’s overall utility achieved in the
MIN goes down with the increase of the number of issue
interdependencies. Moreover, regardless of the number of is-
sue interdependencies, the concurrent negotiation procedure
could achieve the highest overall utility while the successive
negotiation procedure might achieve lowest overall utility.
(2) Success rate of negotiations
Figure 6 shows the success rate of negotiations achieved
Figure 6: Success rate of negotiations in case (a)
by conducting three MIN procedures in case (a). In Figure
6, the x-axis indicates the number of negotiations, and the y-
axis indicates the success rate of negotiations achieved in the
MIN. Figure 6 shows that, regardless of the number of nego-
tiations, the concurrent negotiation procedure could achieve
the best performance in the success rate of negotiations while
the successive negotiation procedure might be the worst one.
Figure 7: Success rate of negotiations in case (b)
Figure 7 shows the success rate of negotiations achieved
by conducting three MIN procedures in case (b). In Figure
7, the x-axis indicates the number of issue interdependen-
cies, and the y-axis indicates the success rate of negotiations
achieved in the MIN. Figure 7 shows that the success rate
of negotiations goes down with the increase of the number
of issue interdependencies. This is because more issue in-
terdependencies would make fewer negotiations successful.
Moreover, regardless of the number of issue interdependen-
cies, the concurrent negotiation procedure could achieve the
highest success rate of negotiations while the successive ne-
gotiation procedure might achieve the lowest success rate of
negotiations.
(3) Number of negotiation rounds
Figure 8 shows the total number of negotiation rounds of
Figure 8: Number of negotiation rounds in case (a)
conducting the MIN by employing three MIN procedures in
case (a). In Figure 8, the x-axis indicates the number of
negotiations, and the y-axis indicates the total number of
negotiation rounds of conducting the MIN. Figure 8 shows
that, regardless of the number of negotiations, the successive
negotiation procedure could achieve the best performance in
the negotiation efficiency while the concurrent negotiation
procedure might be the worst one.
Figure 9: Number of negotiation rounds in case (b)
Figure 9 shows the total number of negotiation rounds of
conducting the MIN by employing three MIN procedures in
case (b). In Figure 9, the x-axis indicates the number of
issue interdependencies, and the y-axis indicates the total
number of negotiation rounds of conducting the MIN. Fig-
ure 9 shows that the total number of negotiation rounds of
conducting the MIN goes up with the increase of the num-
ber of issue interdependencies. This is because more issue
interdependencies would make it more time-consuming in
achieving agreements. Moreover, regardless of the number of
issue interdependencies, the successive negotiation procedure
could achieve the highest negotiation efficiency while the
concurrent negotiation procedure might be the worst one.
In summary, the experimental results show that the pro-
posed negotiation procedures can effectively handle MIN
with various experimental settings. Regarding negotiation
effectiveness, i.e., the agent’s overall utility and the success
rate of negotiations, the concurrent negotiation procedure
could achieve the best performance. Regarding negotiation
efficiency, i.e., the number of negotiation rounds, the suc-
cessive negotiation procedure might be the most efficient
one. However, the clustered negotiation procedure provides a
well-balanced solution between negotiation effectiveness and
efficiency.
6 RELATED WORK
To date, lots of negotiation approaches have been proposed in
handling single negotiations. Ito et al. [10] proposed a negoti-
ation protocol to handle multiple interdependent issues, and
Hemaissia et al. [8] proposed a multilateral negotiation pro-
tocol. These approaches can only handle single negotiations
with independent negotiation goals, which are powerless to
handle MIN. However, our approach focuses on solving the
challenges in MIN.
In the last few years, a number of concurrent one-to-many
negotiation approaches [1, 15–17] are proposed in focusing on
situations where an agent negotiates with other negotiators
on multiple objects. These work tries to solve problems in
multiple negotiations, but their main limitations are that
solutions to negotiation procedures for MIN are not provided
and issue interdependencies across MIN are not well con-
sidered. Niu et al. [19] proposed an approach on multiple
negotiations with dependencies. However, their approach can
only handle single-issue negotiation and does not provide an
MIN procedure. On the contrary, this paper proposes a gen-
eral MIN model, which could cover all possible negotiation
scenarios, and provides three feasible MIN procedures.
So far, little work can be found in solving challenging
problems in MIN, and very few solutions to negotiation pro-
cedures in processing MIN can be found. In order to cover the
limitations of the previous work in MIN, this paper presents
solutions to the challenges in MIN and proposes three feasible
negotiation procedures for agents in processing MIN.
7 CONCLUSION
To effectively handle MIN is a challenging problem in a-
gent negotiation. In this paper, three feasible negotiation
procedures are proposed for processing MIN. With various
experimental settings, an experimental analysis is given to
show the performance of the three proposed negotiation pro-
cedures in conducting MIN. The experimental results show
that the proposed negotiation procedures provide effective
solutions to handling MIN.
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